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NOTES
This was the situation prior to the enactment of the present venue pro-
vision of the FELA. But neither should an unwarranted burden be thrust
upon the defendant. Such a burden was placed on the defendant by the pass-
age of the FELA because of the distinction made by the Supreme Court be-
tween those rights arising under special and general venue provisions.
There appears to be no reason for the continued existence of this dis-
tinction. The plaintiff who seeks to harass a defendant by bringing suit
in a court many miles from the source of the defendant's witnesses, rec-
ords and other evidentiary material should be restrained. Whether this
is done by invoking the doctrine of forum non convemens in the court
of the forum, or by enjoining the plaintiff from continuing his action in
the inconvenient forum is of little consequence. Recognition of the in-
equitable situation and application of some workable remedial measure
are the things of primary importance. When it is dear that the plaintiff
is possessed of an inequitable advantage acquired by the intentional choice
of an inconvenient forum, the suit should be dismissed, transferred or en-
joined so that it may properly be heard by a court whose location, "in
the interest of justice," will best serve the interests of the parties. Since
the Supreme Court recognizes the power of a court to dismiss the suit on
the ground of forum non conveniens, there is no valid reason why another
court should not be able to enjoin the plaintiff from continuing his suit
if the facts warrant.
And when it is considered that but few state courts have expressly
adopted the doctrine of forum non conveniens to protect the defendant,
the argument in favor of allowing a harassed defendant the remedy of in-
junction in FELA cases appears even more sound. It is submitted that
in this respect, the Supreme Court in the Pope case made an unwarranted
distinction between forum non conveniens and injunctions.
RUSSELL J. SPETRNO
Recent Decisions
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS - WAIVER - AMENDMENT
TO OHIO STATUTE
At the 100th session of the Ohio legislature, the existing privileged
communications statute was amended to permit the surviving spouse or the
executor or administrator of the estate of a deceased patient or client to
waive the privilege.'
In their earlier considerations of the privilege the courts of Ohio had
strictly interpreted the statute and had forbade waiver by anyone but the
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patient or client. By so holding the courts denied the right of waiver to
personal representatives,2 beneficiaries of insurance policies3 and will con-
testants.4 Thus, after the death of the patient or client no one could waive
the privilege in most cases. The single exception was in actions for work-
men's compensation, where the surviving dependents of a deceased patient
had been given the right of waiver, this result being derived from an inter-
pretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act rather than from construc-
tion of the privilege statute.5
The effect the new amendment will have upon the admissibility of evi-
dence in pending suits has been settled by the Ohio courts. If at the tune
the action was filed, a witness' testimony would have been incompetent, but
is now competent by virtue of the new amendment, the law in force at the
time of the trial governs and the witness may testify.8
The passage of this amendment places the privileged communication
statute of Ohio on a plane of statutory liberality achieved by only two other
states of the Union.7 The other states have either a limited statutory pro-
"'The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:
(1) an attorney concerning a communication made to him by his client in that
relation or his advice to his client; or a physician, concerning a communication made
to him by his patient in that relation, or his advice to his patient, but the attorney
or physician may testify by express consent of the client or patient, or if the client or
patient be deceased, by the express consent of the surviving spouse or the executor or
administrator of the estate of such deceased client or patient, and if the client or
patient voluntarily testifies, the attorney or physician may be compelled to testify on
the same subject;" OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02 (OHIo GEN. CODE § 11494)
2McKee v. New Idea, Inc., 36 Ohio L Abs. 563, 44 N.E.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1942);
Parisky v. Pierstorff, 63 Ohio App. 503, 27 N.E.2d 254 (1939) But of. Colwell v.
Dwyer, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 455, 35 N.E.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1940).
*N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 116 Ohio St. 693, 158 N.E. 176 (1927); Russell v.
Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 70 Ohio App. 113, 41 N.E.2d 251 (1941); Thompson v.
Nat. Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 68 Ohio App. 439, 37 N.E.2d 621 (1941). But of.
Lumpkin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 75 Ohio App. 310, 62 N.E.2d 189 (1945).
'Swetdand v. Miles, 101 Ohio St. 501, 130 N.E. 22 (1920)
'Industrial Comm'n of Ohio v. Warnke, 131 Ohio St. 140, 2 N.E.2d 248 (1936);
Gillen v. Industrial Comm'n, 59 Ohio App. 241, 17 N.E.2d 663 (1938); Industrial
Comm'n v. Willoughby, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 588 (Ct. App. 1936)
'John v. Bridgman, 27 Ohio St. 22 (1875); Westerman v. Westerman, 25 Ohio St.
500 (1874). The court in the Westerman case pointed out that an amendment in-
volving the admissibility of evidence did not "affect" the pending "action" or "pro-
ceeding" within the meaning of the "Savings Clause," OHIo REV. CODE § 1.20
(OHIO GEN. CODE § 26), but only affected the manner of trying or conducting the
action or proceeding. But cf. Homnyack v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 194 N.Y.
456, 87 N.E. 769 (1909); Wells v. New Eng. Mut. L Ins. Co. of Boston, 187 Pa.
166, 40 At. 802 (1898) (The court admitted in evidence the deposition of a de-
ceased physician which had been made prior to an amendment making incompetent
the testimony of physicians)
'N.Y. CIrv. PRAc. Acr §§ 352, 353, 354 (1904) (personal representatives, execu-
tors, or the surviving spouse, any heir at law or next of kin, or any party in interest
may waive the privilege); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-52 (1953) (the privilege may be
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vision for waiver after death" or their statutes provide no rule of waiver at
all.
In spite of the absence of statutory provision for waiver after death, how-
ever, several state courts have allowed personal representatives of deceased
patients or clients to waive the privilege on the ground that those whom
they represent had such a right.'" Heirs have been demed the rightl ' unless
they too are acting as personal representatives.'
2
Thus the "wholesome amendment" of which an Ohio Supreme Court
judge once spoke13 has finally been given substance, opemng, by the express
consent of the surviving spouse or the executor or adminstrator of the de-
ceased's estate, the lips of physicians and attorneys that had formerly been
firmly sealed by the death of their clients or patients.
RUSSELL Z. BARON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CENSORSHIP OF
MOTION PICTURES
The plaintiff submitted its film to the Ohio Division of Censorship, in
compliance with a statute,' authorizing the board of censors to pass "only
such films as are, in the judgment of the board of censors, of a moral, educa-
tional, or amusing and harmless character. " The board rejected the
film as being "harmful." The plaintiff brought mandamus in the Supreme
waived at any time if in the court's discretion it is necessary for the proper adminis-
tration of justice).
8CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. § 1881 (1937); COLO. STAT. ANN title 4B, c. 177, § 9
(1949); D.C. CODE § 14-308 (1940) ("legal representative" can waive physician-
patient privilege; MxcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.911 (1929) (heirs at law of patient
may waive in will contest only); MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 595.02 (1931) (waiver al-
lowed in physician-patient relationship only, and then only by a beneficiary of a life
insurance policy li existence for more than two years); MISS. CODE ANN. Ch. 8, S
1697 (1952); Wis. STAT. § 325.21 (1951) (personal representatives can waive to
sue for personal injuries to patient;, the beneficiary of the insurance policy may also).
'ALA. CODE § 7726 (1928); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 51, § 5 (1933); IND. STAT. 5
2-1714 (1933); KY. CIV. CODE § 606 (1938); MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 233, § 20
(1932); PA. STAT., tit 28, § 316, 321, 328 (1936); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9777
(1936); WASH. CmP. STAT. § 1214 (1922); W VA. CODE 5 5729 (1937);
WYO. R v. STAT. § 89-1703 (1931).
' Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622, 269 Pac. 993 (1928); Morris v. Morris, 119 Ind.
341, 21 N.E. 918 (1889); Denring v. Butcher, 91 Iowa 425, 59 N.W 69 (1894);
Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206,3 N.W 882 (1879); Olson v. Court of Honor, 100
Minn. 117, 110 N.W 374 (1907); Groll v. Tower, 85 Mo. 249 (1884).
'In re Flints Estate, 100 Cal. 391, 34 Pac. 863 (1893); Gurley v. Park, 135 Ind.
440, 35 NE. 279 (1893).
"Schornick v. Schoraick, 25 Ariz. 563, 220 Pac. 397 (1923); Winters v. Winters,
102 Iowa 53, 71 N.W 184 (1897); Craig v. Craig, 112 Kan. 472, 212 Pac. 72
(1923); Thompson v. Ish, 99 Mo. 160, 12 S.W 510 (1889); In re Gray, 88 Neb.
835, 130 N.W 746 (1911).
' Swetland v. Miles, 101 Ohio St. 501, 504, 130 N.E. 22, 23 (1920).
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Court of Ohio to vacate the order of rejection. The court dismissed the
petition on grounds that the censorship statute did not violate the consttu-
tional guarantee of free speech and was not so indefinite as to violate the
due process clause of the Federal Constitution.2
The plaintiff relied heavily on Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,' a recent United
States Supreme Court decision in which it was held that motion pictures are
within the protection of the First Amendment as it is applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.'
In holding that the New York statute in the Burstyn case was an uncon-
stitutional restraint on free speech, the Supreme Court decided that the
word "sacrilegious" was too indefinite and uncertain to be enforced 5 but
the court did not decide whether movie censorship could be enforced under
a dearly drawn statute.6
The criteria of a statute which delegates legislative power to an adminis-
trative board must be sufficiently definite to enable a court to determine
properly the correctness of that board's decision.7 In Mutud Film Corp. v.
'Oruo REv. CoDx S 3305.04 (OHIo GEN. CODE S 154-47b).
' Superior Films, Inc. v. Dept. of Educ. of the State of Ohio, Div. of Censorship, 159
Ohio St. 315, 112 N.E.2d 311 (1953). In Commercral Pictures Corp. v. Bd. of
Regents of Umversity of State of New York, 305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502 (1953),
decided after the Burstyn case, the New York Court of Appeals also held that motion
pictures are not exempt from censorship and that a statute providing that such pic-
tures shall not be licensed if they are immoral or are of such a character that their
exhibition will tend to corrupt morals, supplies a sufficiently definite standard.
'343 U.S. 495, 72 Sup. Ct. 777 (1952).
'The case of Mutual Film Corp. v. ndrustred Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 35
Sup. Ct 387 (1915) was reversed in so far as it dealt with this point. The Mutual
case had held that" the exhibition of motion pictures is a business, pure and sua-
ple, originated for profit, not to be regarded by the Ohio Constitution
as part of the press of the country or as organs of public opinion. " Id. at 245, 35
Sup. Ct. at 391.
" the censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting cur-
rents of religious views. " Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503, 72 Sup. Ct.
777, 782 (1952).
"'It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every
motion picture at all times and all places." Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
502, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 781 (1952). " There still remains a limited field in which
decency and morals may be protected from the impact of offending motion picture
film by prior restraint under proper criteria." Superior Film, Inc. v. Dept. of Educ.
of the State of Ohio, Div. of Film Censorship, 159 Ohio St. 315, 327, 112 N.E.2d
311, 318 (1953). See Note, 4 WEsT.R Rs. L. Rv. 148 (1953)
TSabre v. Rutland R.R. & Cen. Vt. Ry., 86 Vt. 347, 85 Ad. 693 (1913) Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1935); State ex rel. Chicago,
M. & St. P. R.R. v. Pub. Service Comm'n, 94 Wash. 274, 162 Pac. 523 (1917).
'236 U.S. 230, 35 Sup. Ct. 387 (1915).
'Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 519, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 789 (1952)
"The principal case and the Commercral Pictures case have been reversed by the
United States Supreme Court, 74 Sup. Ct. 286 (1954).
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Industrial Comm'n of Ohio,8 the United States Supreme Court ruled that
the standards and criteria of the Ohio statute did not leave the determination
of the films submitted to it to arbitrary judgment, since the board's judgment
obtained precision from the experience and capabilities of the administrator
and the statute was therefore constitutional. This reasoning apparently was
reaffirmed in the Burstyn case, where the Supreme Court stated, referring to
the Mutuad Film case and the Ohio statute," that it was necessary to find
the terms 'educational, moral, amusing or harmless' do not leave decision to
arbitrary judgment, but this cannot be said of the word 'sacreligious.'9
The Ohio Supreme Court, therefore, relying on the decision in the
Mutual case and the dicta in the Burstyn case, concluded that a state has the
right to censor films under a dearly drawn statute, and that the Ohio statute
is dearly drawn. 0
ERNEST P. MANSOUR
MECHANICS' LIENS - MATERIALMAN - MANUFACTURER
EMPLOYING LABOR AT BUILDING SITE
Under Ohio Revised Code Section 1311.01 (Ohio General Code Sec-
tion 8323-9) a materialman includes all persons by whom any materials
are furnished in, or for any construction, erection, alteration, repair or re-
moval. A subcontractor, on the other hand, includes all persons who under-
take to construct, alter, erect, improve, repair, remove, dig or drill any part
of structures or improvements under a contract with any person other than
the owner. If a manufacturer is classified as a subcontractor, his lien will
al if he has not complied with Ohio Revised Code Section 1311.04 (Ohio
General Code Section 8312), which requires a subcontractor, in order to
perfect a lien, to give to the general contractor a sworn statement alleging
that money due him has not been paid. A materialman need not serve
such notice to perfect his lien.
In the recent case of Rebisso v. Frck, a manufacturer delivered a septic
tank in sections to a building site and employed labor at the site in cement-
ing the sections together. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the manu-
facturer was a materialman.
Two other Ohio Supreme Court cases have considered this question. In
Van Dorn Iron Works Co. v. Erte-Huron Realty Co.,2 the plaintiff furnished
and erected two flights of pressed-steel stairs, as specified, extending from
the basement to the fourth floor on the outside of a building. The court
held that the undertaking was that of contractor, and not a materialman,
under the Mechanics' Lien Statutes. The later case of Matztnger v. Harvard
'159 Oluo St. 449, 112 NXE.2d 651 (1953).
'108 Ohio St. 314, 140 N.E. 325 (1923).
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Lumber Co.3 was one in which a lumber company furnished sash and doors
and performed labor on them, to specifications, before delivery to the de-
fendant's house. There was no labor performed at the construction site and
nothing done relative to the installation of said materials or the fabrication
thereof into the structure, and the lien claimant was adjudged a material-
man, not a subcontractor, under the statute. The same tests were used in
each of these two cases: whether or not labor was employed at the building
site, and whether or not the article supplied was attached to and made a part
of the construction.
On its facts, the principal case falls between the two previous cases.
Like the Van Dorn case, labor was employed at the building site. However,
since the labor employed had nothing to do with the installation of the
septic tank or the fabrication thereof into the structure, the case is also
similar to the Matzmger case. While purporting to follow the Matzmger
case the court placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the labor em-
ployed at the building site was for the benefit of the supplier. The court
arrived at a just decision in classifying the manufacturer as a materialman,
but the case may lead to difficulty in deciding similar cases in the future
because the court apparently relied on the large size of the septic tank as a
determinative factor. It is suggested that if the case concerned a delicate
instrument which could not be safely transported except if unassembled the
result would have been the same.4 Therefore it appears that convenience
or benefit to the supplier and not size is a more nearly correct rationale.
The dissenting opinion in the principal case adheres more closely to a
strict interpretation of the statutory definitions of materialman and sub-
contractor.5 The bare fact that labor in some form was employed by the
supplier at the building site was the test used in the dissent. There was no
consideration given to the fact that the septic tank was in no way connected
up or made a part of the structure by the supplier.0
'115 Ohio St. 555, 155 N.E. 131 (1926).
' There are two other Ohio cases which have attempted to draw a distinction between
a materialman and a subcontractor. In Curtis-Dayton Co. v. Timken Rol. Bearing
Co., 2 Ohio L. Abs. 169 (Ct. of App. 1923), a party furnishing lumber, sashes, door
frames, etc., manufactured in his mill was classified as a materialman and was not
required to serve notice to the owner to perfect his lien. There is no indication in
the opinion as to what test the court used in arriving at its conclusion. The case of
Williamson Htr. Co. v. Radich, 9 Ohio L. Abs. 605, 172 N.E. 852 (Ohio App.
1931) relied heavily on the Matzsnger case in deciding that the installation of a
heater in a house makes the furnisher thereof a subcontractor and not a materialman
within the meaning of the Mechanics' Lien Law. The test the court used was that
labor was employed in installing the heater in the building.
5OHo REv. CODE § 1311.01 (OHio GEN. CODE § 8323-9)
'This is a very literal and strict interpretation of the statute and does not reflect the
true spirit for which it was intended. Had the case been decided in the manner the
dissent suggests, however, a dear-cut line would be drawn; whereby any labor, what-
[Winter
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The Michigan statutes7 define a materialman substantially the same as
the Ohio statutes. If the supplier combines the materials furnished into the
structure by his own labor, he is considered a subcontractor.8
A California case9 held that a manufacturer who employed labor in set-
ting up a boiler in a building in the process of construction was a material-
man and not a contractor. The test used by the court was similar to the
convenience test used in the principal case. The work done on the premises
was only for the purpose of placing the equipment in proper position in
order to complete the contract to furnish it.
The Ohio courts have not indicated a willingness to follow the theory
of some jurisdictions, that the amount of labor in relation to the quantity
of materials supplied, was a factor to be taken into consideration.1 It would
seem that the Ohio courts might well adopt a test such as this, rather than to,
consider in each case whether or not the supplier employed the labor on
the premises for his own convenience, and whether or not the materials
supplied were made a part of the structure by the supplier' 1
WILiAm L. ZIEGLER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREEDOM OF THE PRESS - PRIOR
RESTRAINT ON CIRCULATION
A corporate publisher sought recovery of damages and a permanent in-
junction against the Chief of Police of Youngstown, Ohio, to restrain him
from further ordering the suppression of the sale of certain of the plaintiffs
books. The defendant had threatened to arrest and prosecute a local dis-
tributor for circulating the books in violation of a municipal ordinance'
prohibiting the sale or distribution of obscene or immoral books. The
soever, employed by the supplier on the building site would deem him a contractor
or subcontractor.
7 MICr. STAT. ANN. § 26.309. The Ohio Mechanics Lien Statutes were substantially
copied from the Michigan Mechanics Lien Statutes.
'In Sterner v. Hass, 108 Mich. 488, 66 N.W 348 (1896), the court held that a
plumber who furmshed the necessary materials and labor for the plumbing in a
building is a contractor and not a materialman. Two other Michigan cases have fol-
lowed that reasoning: Stephens Lumber Co. v. Townsend-Stark Corp., 228 Mich.
182, 199 N.W 706 (1924), and Vander Horst v. Kalamazoo Apartments Corp.,
239 Mich. 593, 215 N.W 57 (1927).
'Hinckley v. Field's Biscuit & Cracker Co., 91 Cal. 136, 27 Pac. 594 (1891).
'ODEWrT, OHIO MECH-ANICS LIENS (Supp. 1950, p. 8). See 141 A.L.R. 321
(1942).
"The California courts have applied the comparative cost rule in several cases:
Bennett v. Davis, 113 Cal. 337, 45 Pac. 684 (1896); Peterson v. Friermuth, 17 Cal.
App. 609, 121 Pac. 299 (1911); Prigh v. Moxley, 164 Cal. 374, 128 Pac. 1037
(1912); Hihn-Hammond Lumber Co. v. Elson, 171 Cal. 570, 154 Pac. 12 (1915);
Ferger v. Gearhart, 44 Cal. App. 245, 186 Pac. 376 (1919). The test used was
whether or not the cost of the labor employed is trifling in comparison to the price
of the material supplied.
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court, in granting the injunction, held2 that the ordinance was constitu-
tional3 but that the defendant's conduct4 in placing a prior restraint on
circulation exceeded his powers under the ordinance, deprived the plaintiff
of a property right without due process of law and caused the plaintiff ir-
reparable injury.5
Freedom of the press includes the liberty to circulate as well as the
freedom to publish.0 The preferred position7 which freedom of the press,
"'Any person who shall distribute, sell or expose for sale, or give away any books,
papers, pictures and periodicals or advertising matter of any obscene or immoral
nature, shall be fined in any sum not exceeding one hundred dollars or imprisoned
for not more than thirty days or both." CiTY OF YOUNGsTOWN ORDINANCE No.
305, CODE (1925).
'New Amer. Library of World Literature, Inc. v. Allen, 114 F. Supp. 823 (N.D.
Ohio 1953).
*The court held that the word "obscene" as used in a crminal ordinance is suffia-
ently definite to conform to the constitutional standard of certainty of statutory mean-
ing. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 Sup. Ct. 665 (1948); Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 Sup. Ct. 766 (1942); Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727
(1877). The court further held that the word "immoral" as used in the ordinance,
in juxtaposition to "obscene," also meets that standard. Accord, Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 72 Sup. Ct. 77 (1952); Mutual Films Corp. v. Ohio
Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 35 Sup. Ct. 387 (1915); Superior Films, Inc. v.
Dept. of Educ., Div. of Film Censorship, 159 Ohio St. 315, 112 N.E.2d 311 (1953).
The court declared that the ordinance did not prescribe an unconstitutional test
of obscenity since it is not to be construed so as to prohibit the sale or distribuuon of
books which may contain only isolated passages of obscenity. Cf. State v. Lerner, 51
Ohio L. Abs. 321, 81 N.E.2d 282 (Hamilton Com. PL 1948) Although the lan-
guage "of any obscene or immoral nature" is susceptible of that construction, the
court chose to interpret the ordinance as referring to a book which, considered as a
whole, is obscene. The court supported its interpretation on the ground that the
word "any" may mean "an" and that consequently the ordinance may be read as pro-
hibiting books of an "obscene or immoral nature." This construction of the ordinance
accords with Ohio Revised Code Secuon 715.54 (Ohio General Code Secuon 3663),
which authorizes municipalities to prohibit the sale of obscene literature and reads
in part: "[Municipalities are authorized] to restrain and prohibit the distribution,
sale, and exposure for sale of books of an obscene or immoral nature."
4 In February, 1953, one of the local distributors of plaintiff's publications removed
eleven of plaintiff's books from the Youngstown newsstands. Plaintiff alleged that
this action resulted from the defendant's unlawful conduct in sending to the president
of the local distributing company a list of 108 pocket-books, including the aforesaid
eleven books of plaintiff's, which the defendant considered to be obscene, and threat-
ening the president with prosecution unless these books were removed from the
newsstands.
'The plaintiff's damis for damages were reserved for final determnation on a trial
by jury.
'Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1938); Grosjean v. Amer-
ican Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct. 444 (1936); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S.
727 (1877).
'Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 Sup. Ct. 276 (1946); Jones v. Opelika, 319
U.S. 103, 63 Sup. Ct. 890 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania (City of Jeannette),
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together with freedom of speech and freedom of religion, occupies among
constitutional guarantees insures freedom of the press a special protection
against infringement.8
The trend toward restriction of the police power under ordinances pro-
hibiting the sale or distribution of obscene publications received a strong
impetus from the case of Dearborn Publishig Co. v,. FitzgeraUd.9 In that
case it was held that under such an ordinance 0 city officials may not
censor an obscene newspaper in advance of publication but may only prose-
cute for specific violations of the ordinance once they have occurred.
In holding that the defendant in the principal case had no lawful power
to suppress publications under the threat of arrest and prosecution, the court
adopted the rationale of Bantam Books, Inc. v. Mfelko." In that case the
Superior Court of New Jersey held that a county prosecutor did not have
authority, under a statute12 similar to the ordinance in the principal case,
to order book-circulation companies to withdraw a particular book from
circulation on the ground of obscenity; such conduct violated the constitu-
tional guarantee of freedom of the press.
The protection afforded by the First Amendment shields publishers
against intimidation by private organizations as well as by public officials,
for such organizations may be enjoined from interfering by threats of
prosecution with the distribution of publications which they consider im-
proper1 3
The decision in the instant case seems sound inasmuch as the court held
constitutional an ordinance enacted to protect the public against pornog-
raphy and yet restrained the defendant from further exercising self-dele-
gated powers of censorship. The court properly emphasized the rule that
a court of competent junsdiction and not a police official should decide
whether a publication is obscene.
PETER P. CARLIN
PAYMENT-MISTAKE OF FACT -CHANGE IN POSITION
The defendant-bank accepted an assignment of certain accounts re-
ceivable as collateral security for a loan to the assignor. These were accom-
panied by invoices and straight bills of lading purporting to represent ship-
ments of merchandise to the plaintiff, who was notified of the assignment.
319 U.S. 105, 63 Sup. Ct. 870 (1943); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63
Sup. Ct. 862 (1943).
'See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 Sup. C. 315 (1945).
'271 Fed. 479 (N.D. Ohio 1921).
REv. ORD. OF THE CrrY OF LvLAND S 1770 (1921).
'25 N.J. Super. 292, 96 A.2d 47 (1953).
"N.J. Rnv. STAT. 5§ 2:140.2, 2:140-3, 2:178-6 (1937).
" American Mercury, Inc. v. Chase, 13 F.2d 224 (D. Mass. 1926).
1954]
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The plaintiff, thinking it had received the merchandise, sent a check directly
to the defendant per the notification. The plaintiff, however, had failed
to receive any merchandise. In a suit to recover monies paid under mistake
of fact, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could recover the
amount (from the proceeds of the check) applied by the bank to the as-
signor's debt, but was precluded from recovering the remainder which the
defendant had placed in the assignor's account and which had been with-
drawn by the assignor, because the defendant's position had been changed
with respect to the latter amount.'
The general rule is that money paid under mistake of fact may be re-
covered, 2 unless the payment has caused such a change in the position of
the other party that it would be unjust to require a refund.3 This rule is
based on the fact that the law imposes an obligation on the receiver of money
paid under mistake of fact to pay it back unless he, in good conscience, can
keep it.4 If the payee will suffer a loss by refunding the money in that he
will be left in a worse position than he would have been had the payment to
him never been made,5 i.e., the pre-existing status quo cannot be restored,6
he in good conscience can keep the money.
The change in position rule is subject to a few limitations depending
upon the extent to which the parties were negligent. (1) When the pay-
ment made by a negligent payer was induced by the payee's greater negli-
gence, the payer can recover the money even though the payee's position
has been changed.7  (2) In some jurisdictions,8 but not all,9 a change in
position by the payee will not preclude recovery by the payer where both
'Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Central Nat. Bank of Cleveland, 159 Ohio St. 423,
112 N.E.2d 636 (1953). The court also held that the defendant, as payee of the
check, was not a holder in due course because there was no "negotiation," and thus
was not protected under the Negotiable Instruments Law; a payee cannot be a holder
in due course.
221 R.C.L. 164 and 167 This is so even if the person making the payment was
negligent. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §§ 69, 142.
'Ball v. Shepard, 202 N.Y. 247, 95 N.E. 719 (1911); Hathaway v. Delaware
County, 185 N.Y. 368, 78 N.E. 153 (1906); 21 R.C.L. 170.
'KEENER, QuAsi-CoNTRACTs 59 et. seq. (1893)
Bessler Movable Stairway Co. v. Bank of Leakesville, 140 Miss. 537, 106 So. 445
(1926).
'Clark v. Bradley, 270 S.W 1050 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925)
TUnion Bank v. U.S. Bank, 3 Mass. 74 (1807).
*Lesster v. New York, 33 App. Div. 350, aff'd, 161 N.Y. 628, 55 N.E. 1097
(1899); Clark v. Bradley, 270 S.W 1050 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
'Lake Gogebic Lumber Co. v. Burns, 331 Mich. 315, 49 N.W.2d, 310 (1951);
Leute v. Bird, 277 Mich. 27, 268 N.W 799 (1936); cf. Jefferson County Bank v.
Hansen Lumber Co., 246 Ky. 384, 55 S.W.2d. 54 (1932), where the court said the
loss should fall on the one to whose negligence or fault the loss is most fairly attribu-
table.
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parties are equally innocent or negligent; to bar recovery the payer must be
more negligent than the payee.10
Various tests have been used to determine whether there has been such
a change in position so as to preclude recovery- Does the payee still enjoy
the benefit of the payment or is he left in worse position than if payment
had been refused?11 Did the payee, by receiving payment from the payer,
give up or lose anything of value so that to give the money back would be
unjust?' 2 The change in position that win preclude recovery by the payer
means such a change in the situation of the payee in consequence of the
mistake in payment as will entail financial loss to him if he has to make re-
payment.' 3 An irrevocable and material change must have been caused by
the payment of the money. Where it is not in consequence of the payment,
change in position is immaterial.' 4 It should be noted, however, that spend-
mg the money received is not a change in position which will preclude re-
covery.' 5
The principal case affords an excellent example of the change-in-posi-
tion rule. The defendant bank was required to repay the amount applied
by it to the assignor's debt. This left the defendant in no worse position
than it would have been if the plaintiff had refused payment, for it could
withdraw the credit it had made to the assignor's debt. However, part of
the plaintiff's check had been placed in the assignor's account and with-
drawn by him. The bank therefore could not withdraw this credit, and it
would thus have that much less money than if plaintiff had refused pay-
ment This was such a change in position as to preclude recovery of that
amount by the plaintiff.
DONALD E. BREEsE
SET-OFF -BARRED BY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
IN ACTION BY HEIR AGAINST ADMINISTRATOR
In exchange for her promissory note, A loans $2,600 to B, his sister-in-
1022 AM. & ENG. ENCY. or LAw 626 (2d ed. 1902) presupposes that the "change
in position rule" applies only when the payee is entirely free of mistake or negligence,
or that the payor was negligent, when it states that it is freedom from mistake and
consequent injury and not the inability to put the one receiving the money in his
original position that is the basis of the rule.
' Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cent. Nat. Bank of Cleveland, 159 Ohio St. 423,
112 N.E.2d. 636 (1953).
'Grand Lodge, A.O.U.W of Minn. v. Towne, 136 Minn. 72, 161 N.W 403
(1917).
'Grand Lodge, A.O.U.W of Minn. v. Towne, 136 Minn. 72, 161 N.W 403
(1917); Nat. Bank of Commerce v. Nat Mechamcs' Banking Ass'n, 55 N.Y. 211
(1873).
'
4 IbTu.
"E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 93 F.2d. 475 (2d Cir. 1937).
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law. Eighteen years later A dies intestate and B, who has not yet repaid
the loan, is one of his heirs. It is admitted that the 15-year statute of limita-
tions' has lapsed. Can the, administrator of A's estate -set off this note
against B's distributive share?2
In Summers v. Connolly3 the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the
statute of limitations barred a set-off of thenote. Two dissenting opinions
were rendered in this case, which reaffirmed and restated the Ohio rule as
first promulgated .some 65 years ago.4
The statute of limitations does not bar defenses which are strict defenses,
but it does bar defenses which are affirmative in nature.5 The defenses of
fraud and duress are strict defenses in that they strike at the essence of the
plaintiff's claim and deny its validity.6 But a defense of set-off or counter-
claim' is affirmative in nature because it admits the validity of the plaintiffs
claim and then sets up an affirmative cross-demand." Thus, when asserted,
the statute of limitations will bar a stale claim which is raised by set-off as
readily as it will bar a separate action commenced upon such a demand.
There is a split of authority as to whether an exception should be made
to this general rule when the administrator of an estate attempts to set off
'OHIo Ray. CODE S 2305.06 (OHIO GEN. CODE § 11221) "An action upon a
specialty or an agreement, contract or promise in writing shall be brought within
fifteen years after the cause thereof accrued."
'Patrick Connolly died intestate and his heirs agreed to sell a parcel of his real estate.
The deed was deposited with an escrow agent who was to receive the purchase price
and distribute it among the heirs.
Bridget McGovern was the sister of Margaret Connolly, Patrick's deceased wife.
Under the provisions of Ohio Revised Code Section 2105.10 (Ohio General Code
Section 10503-5), one-half of Patricks estate passed to Margaret's brothers and
sisters.
When the administrator of the estate claimed the amount of the note should be
set off against Bridget McGovern's share, Margaret's heirs, joining as plaintiffs, filed
a petition in probate court for a declaratory judgment The administrator of the
estate, the rest of the heirs, the escrow agent and the purchaser of the real estate in-
volved were joined as defendants.
' 159 Ohio St. 396, 112 N.E.2d 391 (1953).
'Harrod v. Carder's Adm'r, 3 Ohio C.C. 479 (1888).
'Harris Stanley Coal & Land Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 154 F.2d 450 (6th Cir.
1946); Kocsorak v. Cleveland Trust Co., 151 Ohio St. 212, 85 N.E.2d 96 (1949);
Bryant v. Swedand, 48 Ohio St. 194, 27 N.E. 100 (1891)
OPOMEROY, CODE REMEDIES 848 (4th ed. 1904)
' Historically, a set-off arose out of a different cause of action from that which the
plaintiff had pleaded, while a counterclaim arose out of the same transaction which
formed the basis of the plaintiff's demand. BLISS, CODE PLEADING 552 (3d ed.
1894). This distinction was abolished by Ohio Revised Code Section 2309.16
(Ohio General Code Section 11317).
'POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES 848 (4th ed. 1904)
'Clyburn v. Toney, 245 Ala. 341, 17 So.2d 235 (1944); Bank Savings Life Ins. Co.
v. Gann, 120 Kan. 38, 242 Pac. 478 (1926); Francisco v. Francisco, 120 Mont. 468,
191 P.2d 317 (1948); Oft v. Dornacker, 131 Neb. 644, 269 N.W 418 (1936).
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a stale debt against an heir's distributive share. The English courts and
',probably the majority of the American courts do recognize such an excep-
tion. ° In allowing the set-off these courts base their decision on either an
"equity theory" or a "legal theory-"
The equity theory holds that an heir should not be permitted to receive
his share while retaining part of the fund out of which all the shares are to
be paid. In good conscience he should repay his debt before he collects
his share." The legal theory maintains that the statute of limitations is a
statute of repose' 2 and does not extinguish the debt.1 3 The debt repre-
sents a portion of the assets of the estate which is already in the heir's posses-
sion. It follows that the amount of the debt should be set off against the
heir's distributive share.
A large number of jurisdictions, however, do not allow the administrator
to set off such a note. 5  Several cogent arguments sustain the position of
these courts. First, in this country, unlike England,' 6 an heir has a legal
claim against the estate for his distributive share; the estate is legally in-
debted to him."T Next in keeping with the theory of limitations of ac-
tions, 8 an heir, like any other debtor, should be protected against old
claims." And lastly, these courts conclude that in all probability the decedent
"°Florida Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Gardner, 154 Fla. 801, 19 So.2d 5 (1944);
Cox v. Brady, 58 Ga. App. 498, 199 S.E. 242 (1938); Fleming v. Yeazel, 379 IMl.
343, 40 N.E.2d 507 (1942); Frank v. Wareheim, 177 Md. 43, 7 A.2d 186 (1939);
Lewis v. Lewis, 211 Minn. 587, 2 N.W.2d 134 (1942); Fischer v. Wilhelm, 139
Neb. 583, 298 N.W 126 (1941); Sheridan v. Riley, 133 N.J. Eq. 288, 32 A.2d 93
(Ch. 1943); Hamilton v. Kenton, 190 Wash. 646, 70 P.2d 426 (1937); lo Re
Wheeler, (1904) 2 Ch. 66; Dingle v. Coppen, (1899) 1 Ch. 726.
'Holmes v. McPheeters, 149 Ind. 587, 49 N.E. 452 (1898).
" A statute of repose is one designed to protect the individual from being prosecuted
upon stale claims. The difficulty of preserving evidence, the frailty of memory and
the contingency of death of witnesses justify such statutes. Statutes of repose do not
bar the right, they only bar the remedy. As such they must be distinguished from
statutes based on a presumption of payment of the debt. 34 AM. JUn. 16.
'Townsend v. Eichelberger, 51 Ohio St. 213, 38 N.E. 207 (1894).
1 4Cox v. Brady, 58 Ga. App. 498, 199 S.E. 242 (1938).
1 Luscher v. Security Trust Co., 178 Ky. 593, 199 S.W 613 (1918); Allen v. Ed-
wards, 136 Mass. 138 (1883); Perry v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 223 N.C.
642, 27 S.E.2d 636 (1943); McNamara v. Ayers, 191 S.C. 228, 196 S.E. 545
(1938).
" Deeks v. Strutt, 5 T.R. 690 (1792).
'Hoil v. Libby, 80 Me. 320, 14 At. 201 (1888); Perry v. First Citizens Bank &
Trust Co., 223 N.C. 642, 27 S.E.2d 636 (1943).
"Townsend v. Eichelberger, 51 Ohio St. 213, 38 N.E. 207 (1894).
"Luscher v. Security Trust Co., 178 Ky. 593, 199 S.W 613 (1918); Harrod v.
Carder's Adm'r, 3 Ohio C.C. 479 (1888).
Holt v. Libby, 80 Me. 320, 14 At. 201 (1888).
: Ibul.
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intended to forgive the debt 20 The latter argument has merit when one
considers that most of these loans are made between dose relatives, and
that if the decedent intended to collect the debt, he could have done so dur-
mng his lifetime or provided for a set-off of it in his wil21
Since both sides of this question have much merit, it is problematical
whether the various courts will ever be in accord.
RicHARD J. CusiC, JR.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - REGULATION OF SOLICITATION
The American Cancer Society brought an action against the City of
Dayton to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinancel requiring anyone making
a house-to-house solicitation to obtain a permit from a municipal board.
A permit was denied upon the ground that the Dayton Community Chest
had already collected funds for the cancer research, and a permit to raise
funds for hospital buildings during the same month had already been
issued. The Ohio Supreme Court, in affirming the enjoining order, held
that the Dayton ordinance violated both the Federal2 and Ohio Constim-
tions.3 The court said charitable solicitations come within the constitu-
tional guarantees of freedom of speech, press and liberty of action, and
that the ordinance does not lay down proper standards but allows arbitrary
exercise of power by licensing officials.'
Courts have often stated that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights are
subject to limitations to promote the health, safety, morals and general
welfare of the people.5 These freedoms are guaranteed against state en-
'Section 638-4 of the Dayton Municipal Code provides four considerations the So-
licitations Advisory Board is to weigh prior to recommending the granting of a per-
rmt. They were to consider whether: (1) the field has not been covered; (2) the
institution is beneficial to the people; (3) it is not an unwarranted burden on the
people; (4) it does not interfere with other permits.
2 U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § I "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any .State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
'OHIo CoNsT. ART. I, § 11. "Every cazen may freely speak, write, and publish his
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law
shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of press. ""
OHiO CONsT. Art. I, § 2: "All political power is inherent in the people. Gov-
ernment is instituted for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right
to alter, reform, or abolish the same, whenever they may deem it necessary; and no
special privileges or immumties shall ever be granted, that may not be altered, re-
voked or repealed by the General Assembly."
4American Cancer Society, Inc. v. Dayton, 160 Ohio St. 114, 114 N.E.2d 219
1953.
'Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 27 Sup. Ct. 289 (1906); Cincinnati v. Correll,
141 Ohio St. 535, 49 N.E.2d 412 (1943); Brown v. City of Stillwater, 78 Old. Cr.
399, 149 P.2d 509 (1941). These limitations come under the police power, which
[Winter
RECENT DECISIONS
croachment by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the legislative power of
municipalities must yield when their abridgement is shown.6 Courts are
therefore reluctant to allow indiscriminate exercise of police power!
Regulation of solicitation is often validly claimed to be a denial of free-
dom of speech and freedom of religion.8 It has been held that members
of a religious group who called at homes to preach and to solicit donations
could not be required to obtain a permitO Similarily an ordinance provid-
ing for a charities commission to investigate solicitations to determine if a
permit should be given was held invalid.10 The United States Supreme
Court, in holding a regulatory statute unconstitutional, stated that arbitrary
discretion in the hands of licensing officials is the invalidating factor in
solicitation regulation."1
Where arbitrary limitations on solicitation do not appear to exist, the
courts have had no trouble in upholding regulation.1 2  Thus it was held
proper for a state to protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by re-
quiring a solicitor to establish his identity before permitting him to publicly
solicit funds.1 8 A state may also by non-discriminatory legislation, regulate
the times, places and manner of soliciting in order to safeguard the peace
and comfort of the community. 4 It has been held that solicitation of con-
is the power vested in the legislature to make such laws as they shall judge to be for
the good of the commonwealth and its subjects.
'Black v. Berea, 137 Ohio St. 611, 32 N.E.2d 1 (1941); Jones v. Circleville, 78
Ohio St. 122,84 N.E. 792 (1908).Tibid.
a Waite, The Debt of Coniutftonad Law to Jehovah's itsses, 28 MINN. L REV.
209 (1944).
In Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 290, 71 Sup. Ct 328 (1951), the convic-
ton of two Jehovahs Witnesses for attempting to hold peaceable meetings without a
permit was held invalid because the absence of narrowly defined standards permitted
arbitrary exercise of the licensing power.
In Kuntz v. New York, 340 US. 290, 71 Sup. Ct. 328 (1951) a New York city
ordinance requiring religious speakers to obtain a license before speaking in the
streets was held invalid because the ordinance lacked adequate standards and per-
mitted licensing officials to act arbitrarily.
In an earlier Georgia case, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 US. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666
(1938), an ordinance prohibiting distribution of literature by hand unless a permit
was obtained from the city manager was held invalid on its face by a unanimous court.
'Tucker v. Randall, 18 N.J. Misc. 675, 15 A.2d 324 (1940).
'
0 In re Dart, 172 Cal. 47, 155 Pac. 63 (1916).
' Cantwell v. Commn, 310 U.S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct 900 (1940).
'
2Murphy v. Columbus, 2 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 484 (1904).
13Manchester v. Leiby, 117 F.2d 661, cert. dented, 313 U.S. 562, 61 Sup. Ct. 838
(1941).
14Hamilton v. Montrose, 109 Colo. 228, 124 P.2d 757 (1942).
Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 27 CaL2d 232, 163 P.2d 704 (1945).
1 Ex parte Hogg, 20 Tex. Crim. Rep. 161, 156 S.W 931 (1913).
Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112 (1933).
19541
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tributions for charitable purposes are subject to the police power to the
extent that reasonable regulation of the persons and application of funds is
permitted.15
The courts do not seem to encounter too many difficulties in upholding
regulations pertaimng to commercial solicitations. An ordinance was up-
held which made it unlawful to peddle merchandise on the public square
or within the corporate limits of a city.-0 Also a mumcipal ordinance
prohibiting commercial solicitors from making uninvited calls at private
residences was held to be an appropriate exercise of police power. 7
The cases seem to indicate that regulation of commercial solicitation
may be upheld, but regulation of charitable or religious solicitation may nor.
Although the latter may be equally as vexatious as the former, courts have
been reluctant to lay down definite standards in regulating charitable or
religious solicitations. In the principal case, the Ohio Supreme Court has
done little to aid municipalities in formulating defimte standards by which
their citizenry may be protected from undue harassment from charitable or
religious solicitation.
HARRY STEIN
BILLS AND NOTES - WARRANT OF ATTORNEY -
EXTENSION BY PARTIAL PAYMENT
The plaintiff took the demand cognovit note of the defendant in 1931.
The last notation of partial payment was dated 1935. In 1950 the plaintiff
took judgment on the note, through confession of an attorney purporting
to act for the defendant under the warrant of attorney in the cognovit note.
The trial court dismissed the defendant's petition to vacate the judgment.
The Ohio Supreme Court, in affirming' the Court of Appeals' reversal of
the decision of the trial court, held that a partial payment by an obligor on
a written note will operate to extend the time within which an action may
be brought on the note for fifteen years2 beyond the time of such payment.
But, in the absence of a statute providing therefor, mere payments will not
operate to extend the time within which an attorney is authorized to con-
'Alliance First Nat. Bank v. Spies, 158 Ohio St. 499, 110 N.E.2d 483 (1953). The
court said, in a dictum since more than six years had elapsed, that such part payment
at most would operate as an implied, unwritten promise to give power to confess
under the warrant of attorney. Such promise would be controlled by Ohio Revised
Code Section 2305.07 (Ohio General Code Section 11222), which limits actions to
six years after an unwritten promise. Thus, part payment on the last day of the
statutory period would extend the power of attorney to confess judgment for another
six years.
2OHIO REv. CODE § 2305.08 (Otno GEN. CODE § 11223) "An action upon a
speciality or an agreement, contract or promise in writing shall be brought within
fifteen years after the cause thereof accrued."
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Less judgment under a warrant of attorney for more than six years beyond
the date of the last of such payments.
Several states by statute expressly limit the use of general warrants of
attorney to confess judgment.3 States allowing general warrants of attorney
to confess judgment require that they be strictly construed in favor of the
debtor.4
The Ohio courts adhere to the theory of strict construction, the reason
being that the power granted under the warrant is one of special agency
with limited power, constituted for a particular purpose, and the attorney
cannot bind his principal if he exceeds that power.6 Thus in Ohio, it has
been held that power for joint confession does not permit confession as to
one of the makers,7 authority to confess against a firm does not authorize
confession against individuals thereof," power to confess liability for a
breach of covenant authorizes confession of liability only after the breach is
established by law,9 and payment on a joint and several note by one of the
makers does not extend the statutory period of limitations for confession as
to the others.'0 Also, a warrant of attorney to confess judgment does not
authorize an appearance before the note becomes due," confession after the
statutory period expires where there has been no partial payment,' 2 or con-
fession of facts which would revitalize the note'
The decision of the principle case is an application of the strict con-
struction rule. The court reasoned that part payment extends the statutory
period of limitations only because such part payment justifies the implica-
tion of a new promise' 4
There is apparently only one case 5 directly in point with the principal
case. In this case judgment was confessed more than six years after the
'A-A. CoDE ANN. tide20 § 16 (1949); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.05 (1941); IND.
ANN. STAT. S 2-2904 (Burns 1946); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. S 372.140 (Baldwin
1943); N. M. STAT. ANN. S 19-918 (1941); TEXAS CIV. STAT. ANN. art 2224
(1942); W VA. CODE ANN. § 5603 (1949).
'Weber v. Powers, 213 I1. 370, 72 N.E. 1070 (1905); Fordwood v. Magness, 143
Md. 1, 121 AtL 855 (1923); Park Hotel Co. v. Eckstein-Miller Auto Co., 181 Wis.
72, 193 N.W 998 (1923).
'Marrianthal v. Mosler, 16 Ohio St. 566 (1866).
'Spencev. Emerne, 46 Ouo St. 433, 21 N.E. 866 (1889).
'Hazzard v. Shick, 151 Ohio St. 535, 86 N.E.2d 785 (1949).
'Mansfield Savings Bank v. Post, 22 Ohio C.C. 644 (1893).
'Fitzgerald v. Wiggins, 6 Oho Dec. Repr. 1201 (Hamilton Dist. Ct. 1883).
" Marnanthal v. Mosler, 16 Ohio St. 566 (1866).
'Lewis v. Moon, 1 Ohio CC 211 (1885).
"State ex rel. Squire v. Winch, 66 Ohio App. 221, 32 N.E.2d 569 (1939).
'Roberts v. Davis, 66 Ohio App. 527, 35 N.E.2d 609 (1940).
'Cf. Kerperv. Wood, 48 Ohio St. 613,29 N.E. 501 (1891).
' Cross v. Moffat, 11 Colo. 210, 17 Pac. 771 (1881). In Kabh v. Lesser, 97 Wis.
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